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THE LATEST WORD FROM THE SUPREME
COURT ON PUNITIVE DAMAGES
Honorable Leon D. Lazer
The first case I will be discussing is Cooper Industries v.
Leatherman.2 It dealt with punitive damages, and it has rather
important local and statewide import because of the large number
of punitive damage claims in New York.3
In Cooper Industries, the punitive damages claim was
based on the premise that the conduct precipitating the principal
cause of action was so bad it warranted punitive damages.4 In
New York, under Pattern Jury Instructions 2:278, the judge
instructs the jury that punitive damages can be awarded if the act
was wanton and reckless or malicious. 5 The Pattern Jury Charge
goes on further to say:
There is no exact rule by which to decide the
amount of punitive damages. The amount that you
award as punitive damages need not have any
particular ratio or relationship to the amount you
award to compensate the plaintiff for (his, her)
injuries. If you find that the defendant's act was
(wanton and reckless, malicious), you may award
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2 532 U.S. 424 (2001).
3 id.
4 id.
5 N.Y. PATTERN JURY INSTR., CIvIL 2:278 (3d ed. 2000).
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such amount as in your sound judgment and
discretion you find will punish the defendant and
discourage the defendant or other (people,
companies) from acting in a similar way in the
future.6
This Pattern Jury Instruction is largely based on New
York Court of Appeals holdings.7
Punitive damages claims do not constitute a separate cause
of action, but simply consist of another allegation added to an
existing cause of action. If the jury finds that there is liability for
punitive damages, then evidence may be submitted as to the
financial status of the defendant. 8 In New York, the trial is
bifurcated. 9 If the jury returns and finds, in response to a written
question, that the defendant's conduct was reckless and malicious,
then the second phase of the trial begins and the financial status
of the defendant can be offered.' 0 Considering that this occurs in
the midst of trial, the plaintiff may be provided with only one or
two days of discovery to establish the financial capacity and
wealth of the defendant." I am unsure of how this actually
works in practice.
The New York Court of Appeals has held that a punitive
damage award should not be disturbed unless it is so grossly
excessive as to warrant the conclusion that it was "actuated by
passion." 12 However, for a long time the United States Supreme
61d.
7 See, e.g., Gostkowski v. Roman Catholic Church of Sacred Hearts of Jesus
& Mary, 262 N.Y. 320, 323-25 (1933) (setting forth the definition of
"wanton" used in the New York pattern jury charge). See also Lamb v. S.
Cheney & Son, 227 N.Y. 418, 422 (1920) (delineating the definition of
"malicious" used in the New York pattern jury charge).
8 See Smith v. Lightning Bolt Productions, Inc., 861 F.2d 363, 374 (2d Cir.
1988) (stating that after the jury finds in favor of the claimant on the issues of
liability and compensatory damages then evidence on the financial condition of
the defendant may be presented).
9 DAVID D. SIEGEL, NEW YORK PRACTICE § 130 (3d ed. 1999).
'o Suozzi v. Parente, 161 A.D.2d 232, 554 N.Y.S.2d 617 (1st Dep't 1990).
1Id.
12 Nardelli v. Stamberg, 44 N.Y.2d 500, 406 N.Y.S.2d 443 (1978).
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PUNITIVE DAMAGES
Court refrained from getting involved in the area of punitive
damages or the constitutionality of such awards. But within the
last fifteen years or so, substantial interest in the area became
apparent,' 3 ultimately leading to the Cooper Industries decision
last May. 14
In Cooper Industries, the Supreme Court worked a very
significant change on the punitive damage scene.15 The Court
decided by an eight-to-one vote that appellate review of punitive
damage verdicts requires de novo, rather than. abuse of discretion,
review.1 6 The significance of this decision stems from the fact
that abuse of discretion review is a deferential review with
deference given to the findings of the jury."' However, de novo
review does not provide such deference. The entire case is
reviewed on the record, and the appellate court determines the
suitability of the damage award.' 8 When this decision came
down, tort reformers commented that juries will not be deciding
punitive damages, rather, judges will.
Before Cooper Industries, there was a long, national
tradition associated with the idea that juries were relatively
unconstrained in fixing punitive damages. 19  In 1851, the
Supreme Court decided Day v. Woodworth20 and declared that it
was a well-established common law principle that a jury can
impose punitive damages and the question does not admit
argument. 21 The Seventh Amendment protects the right to a jury
13 Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415 (1994); TXO Production Corp.
v. Alliance Resources Corp., 509 U.S. 443 (1993); Pacific Mutual Life Ins.
Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1 (1991).
4 Cooper Industries, 532 U.S. at 424.
" Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
16 Id. at 431.
17 Id. at 436.
18 Id.
19 See Barry v. Edmunds, 116 U.S. 550, 565 (1886) (noting that it is the
function of the jury to determine the amount of the verdict as no precise rule of
law fixes recoverable damages).
20 54 U.S. 363, 371 (1851).
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trial in any matter where there was such a right at common law,22
but the Seventh Amendment does not apply to the appellate stage,
so the Supreme Court was free to establish an appellate rule.23
What has happened in the last fifteen years in the Supreme
Court is due, to some degree, to the tort reform movement and
the fact that more conservative Justices were in the position to
work their will. Nevertheless, two of the most conservative
Justices, Justice Scalia and Thomas were simply opposed to any
restraints on punitive damages. 24 When Justice Scalia visited
Touro about five or six years ago, he had lunch with the faculty
and was asked a question about punitive damages. In the course
of responding, he observed that "when those guys come in to
argue against punitive damages"-of course this is not an exact
quote by any means-" you can smell the wealth in the room and
see the expensive suits and tasseled shoes." A pretty strong
comment by a judge, but he has been consistent on this issue.
25
It is about fifteen years since the due process issues started
to bubble in punitive damages cases. 26 The question was whether
the defendant had the benefit of due process when a jury was
permitted to levy almost any amount of money in damages
without relation to the amount awarded for compensatory
damages.27  In Santosky v. Kramer,2  a 1982 case, the Court
spoke for the first time of requiring some intermediate standard
22 U.S. CONST. amend. VII states in pertinent part: "In Suits at common
law... the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by jury,
shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than
according to the rules of the common law."
23 See, e.g., Cooper, 532 U.S. at 437 (finding that as the jury's award of
punitive damages does not constitute a finding of "fact," appellate review of
the District Court's determination that an award is consistent with due process
does not implicate the Seventh Amendment).
24 See, e.g., TXO, 509 U.S. at 470. (Scalia, J. and Thomas, J. concurring)
(finding it difficult to imagine that substantive due process contains the right to
not be subjected to excessive punitive damages).
25 Id.
26 See, e.g., Id. at 457.
27 id.
28 455 U.S. 745, 756 (1982).
110 [Vol 18
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PUNITIVE DAMAGES
of proof where the defendant showed detrimental loss beyond
money, such as damage to his or her reputation. 29
In 1986, the Court heard Aetna Lift Insurance Co. v.
Lavoie,30 involving a $3.5 million punitive damage verdict.3'
Although the case was decided on other grounds, the Court noted
that the defendant's constitutional arguments raised issues that, in
a proper setting, must be resolved.32 Then, in the 1991 case of
Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip,33 involving insurance
fraud, the Court sustained an eight hundred thousand dollar
punitive damages verdict, which was four times the amount of the
compensatory damages. 34 Furthermore, the amount awarded far-
exceeded Alabama's fines for insurance fraud.35 Writing for the
Court, Justice Blackmun declared that it was not per se
unconstitutional to assess punitive damages by the common law
method.36 Justice O'Connor dissented and paraphrased the
judge's instruction to the jury as follows: "Think about how
much you hate what the defendants did and teach them a
lesson." 37 Incidentally, in Haslip, Justice O'Connor laid out a
whole series of standards that the Alabama Supreme Court had
utilized relative to what a jury should be charged in such a case.38
Justice Blackmun, who wrote the majority decision, did say that
while .the majority had affirmed the judgment, such unfettered
29 id.
30 475 U.S. 813 (1986).
31 Id
32 Id. at 828-29.
33 499 U.S. at 1.
34 Id.
351 Id. at23.
36 Id. at 17.
31 Id. at 49 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
38 Id. at 51. Judge O'Connor listed seven factors that the Alabama Supreme
Court had previously considered relevant to the sine of a punitive damages
award including that "punitive damages should bear a reasonable relationship
to the harm that is likely to occur from the defendant's conduct" and that "the
degree of reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct should be considered."
Citing Green Oil Co. v. Hornsby, 539 So.2d 218, 223-224 (Ala. 1989),
quoting Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 505 S.2d 1050, 1062 (Ala. 1987)
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discretion might invite extreme results that jar one's
sensibilities. 9
In 1993, a major decision was rendered in TXO
Production v. Alliance Resource.40  There, the plaintiff was
awarded nineteen thousand dollars in compensatory damages and
ten million dollars in punitive damages, 526 times the amount of
compensatory damages .4 1 The Court granted certiorari to decide
whether in awarding such damages, the lower court had violated
the Due Process Clause.42 The majority decided that the
relationship between compensatory and punitive damages was
only one factor to be considered, that there was no bright line and
each case was unique.43 Further, the Court found that the
defendant's malicious and absolutely fraudulent conduct in trying
to deprive the plaintiff of very valuable oil leases-if you read the
case what they did was absolutely dreadful-was so fraudulent
and malicious, that the punitive damage verdict of ten million
dollars was reasonable." Justices Scalia and Thomas were
consistent in their point of view that there was no substantive due
process right involved in punitive damages, and there was no
requirement that punitive damages be reasonable under the Due
Process Clause.45 Justice O'Connor dissented. She called the
award monstrous and found that the state procedures for arriving
at the award were wholly inadequate.46
That brings us to BMW of North America v. Gore, 7
decided only a year later. The case concerned a brand new
'9 Haslip, 499 U.S. at 18.
40 509 U.S. at 443.
41 Id. at 453.
42 id.
41 Id. at 458.
" Id. at 462. After TXO discovered large reserves of oil and gas under a
tract of land that Alliance Resources held the oil and gas rights to, in bad faith
they tried to advance a claim on the tract, using a worthless quitclaim deed.
The Court emphasized the fact that TXO's scheme was part of "a larger
pattern of fraud, trickery and deceit" and that millions of dollars had
potentially been at stake.
45 Id. at 470.
46 TXO, 509 U.S. at 473. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
47 517 U.S. at 559.
112 [Vol 18
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BMW that had been sold to Dr. Gore.48 When Dr. Gore's vehicle
initially had arrived at BMW's vehicle preparation plant, it had
some scratches on it and it had to be repainted. 49 However, Dr.
Gore was not informed about the repainting, and when he
subsequently bought the car and took it to an independent dealer
to have some detailing done on it, he was informed that his car
had previously been repainted.50 As a consequence, Dr. Gore
sued BMW.
51
During the course of the trial, it was shown that the cost
of repair was six hundred dollars, but Dr. Gore's expert testified
that the repainting had reduced the value of the car that he bought
by four thousand dollars. 2 So the compensatory damages were
four thousand dollars, but the jury also awarded four million
dollars in punitive damages.53 How did they arrive at that figure?
Well, they found that BMW had previously done this kind of
repainting in approximately one thousand cases. 54  Thus, four
thousand dollars multiplied by the one thousand cars gave them
the four million-dollar punitive damage verdict. 5' The Alabama
Supreme Court subsequently reduced the punitive damage award
to two million dollars.
56
In BMW, the Supreme Court really took hold of the due
process issue and declared that the amount was grossly excessive
and amounted to a severe criminal penalty in violation of the
Constitution.57 Dr. Gore argued that the punitive award was an
appropriate penalty for selling one thousand cars for more than
they were worth. 58 The Supreme Court's response to that was
that no jury can decide to punish legal conduct that takes place in
48 id.
49 Id. at 563.
so Id.
st Id.
52 BMW, 517 U.S. at 564.
13 Id. at 565.
5 Id. at 564.
55 Id.
56 BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 646 So.2d 619, 629 (Ala. 1994), reversed
and remanded by BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. at 559.
s7 BMW, 517 U.S. at 574.
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other states, 59 and that BMW had been deprived of due process
by the excessive award.6 °
So what do we do about our punitive damage charges and
procedures in New York? BMW was deprived of due process
because it had no notice that its conduct may have subjected it to
such a severe penalty. 61 Due process requires that a person
receive fair notice, not only of the conduct that will subject him
or her to punishment, but also of the severity of punishment that a
state may impose. 62 Now, how do you do that absent a detailed
statute? How do you tell BMW that if it repaints cars and doesn't
tell the buyers, it may get hit with a two million-dollar penalty?
Accordingly, there is a real problem in applying the BMW rule in
the absence of a punitive damage statute. Defendants cannot
discover at the trial that they may be subject to a two million-
dollar penalty; they have to have notice in advance that their
conduct subjects them to the possibility of such a penalty.
In BMW, the court set up three guideposts for appellate
63 frtte" oreview. The first guidepost for review is the "degree or
reprehensibility" of the defendant's conduct.64 The second
guidepost is the disparity between the harm suffered by the
plaintiff and the punitive damage award.65 Well, how do you get
from four thousand dollars to two million dollars, or, for that
matter, from nineteen thousand dollars to ten million dollars?
Therefore, disparity is in the ballpark now and it has to be
considered. If it is going to be considered by the appellate court,
the jury has to know something about the connection between the
harm and the amount of punitive damages. In New York, we
have not been telling our juries about that. The third guidepost is
"the difference between [the punitive damage award] and the civil
penalties authorized or imposed in comparable cases." 66 In other
'9 Id. at 573.
60 /d. at 586.
61 Id. at 574.
62 BMW, 517 U.S. at 574.
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words, what is the civil penalty for selling a car in that condition
without telling the buyer? Well, I do not think it can be very
much. This type of standard-a comparison with what the
legislature may have enacted as a civil penalty for selling a car
while withholding the fact that the car was repainted-is not
going to provide a basis for upholding a large judgment.67
Justices Breyer, O'Connor and Souter concurred that there was a
denial of due process to BMW because there were no state
standards to distinguish between conduct that. warranted large or
small awards.68 Justices Thomas and Scalia dissented, declaring
that it is none of the Court's business and due process has nothing
to do with punitive damages. 69 As a matter of fact, Justice Scalia
said the Constitution does not make it any of the Court's business
if punitive damages 'run wild,' 70 so the Court should stay out of
it.71 It is state business and has nothing to do with the Federal
Constitution.72 That is what Justice Ginsburg wrote in her dissent
as well.73 She said it is a matter for the states.
All of this brings us to last June's case, Cooper Industries
v. Leathernan.75 Leatherman manufactured a sort of a Swiss
Army knife with a modification on it, which it called a 'Pocket
Survival Tool. 76 The modification was that you could unfold the
Swiss-Army-type device to almost full size pliers.77 This is an
interesting device, and Cooper Industries, a competitor, decided
to copy it and to market another multifunctional tool, which they
called the "ToolZall." 78 They advertised their tool, which was
really the Leatherman tool design, at one of the big trade
67 BMW, 517 U.S. at 586.
68 Id. (Breyer, J., concurring).
69 Id. at 598 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
70 Id. at 586 (quoting Haslip, 499 U.S. at 18).
71 BMW, 517 U.S. at 607.
72 Id.
73 d. at 607.
74 Id.
7s Cooper, 532 U.S. at 424.
76 Id. at 427.
77 Leatherman Tool Group v. Cooper Industries, 199 F.3d 1009, 1010 (9th
Cir. 1999).
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shows.79 Many people at the trade show saw a sample of what
Cooper Industries represented as the "ToolZall;" but rather, it
was a "mock-up" of the Leatherman original tool.
80
The action was brought under the Lanham Act8' and on a
common law claim, charging unfair competition and trade-dress
infringement, and a preliminary injunction was granted.82 The
jury found Cooper guilty of false advertising and unfair
competition and awarded fifty thousand dollars in compensatory
damages, and $4.5 million in punitive damages. 83  After the
verdict, the District Court rejected the argument that the punitive
damage were excessive.84 On appeal, the Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit, issuing two separate decisions, set aside the
permanent injunction85 because that was not an issue any more,
and affirmed the $4.5 million punitive damage judgment finding
that it was necessary to create deterrence and the award was not a
violation of Cooper's due process right.
86
In an 8 to 1 decision, Justice Stevens wrote for the
majority, and he declared that compensatory damages "are
intended to redress concrete loss that the plaintiff has suffered,"
while, punitive damages "operate as private fines intended to
punish the defendant and deter future wrongdoing. " 87 In his
view, the jury's compensatory damage award is a factual
determination, whereas, "punitive damages [are] an expression of
moral condemnation," which does not involve a factual
79 id.
80 Id.
8 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (2001).
82 Leatherman Tool Group v. Cooper Industries, 1996 U.S. Dist. LExis
21976, at *19 (D. Or. Dec. 18, 1996).
83 Leatherman Tool Group v. Cooper Industries, 1997 U.S. Dist. LExis
22763, at *1 (D. Or. Nov. 17, 1997) (entering judgment based on the jury
verdict from Oct. 17, 1997 and ordering a permanent injunction).
84 id.
85 Leatherman Tool Group, 199 F.3d at 1009 (reversing the permanent
injunction issued against Cooper Industries).
86 Leatherman Tool Group v. Cooper Industries, 205 F.3d 1351 (9th Cir.
1999) (affirming the punitive damages award).
87 Cooper, 532 U.S. at 432.
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determination. 88 Stevens further noted that state legislators have
broad discretion in fixing criminal penaRties and imposing
punitive damages, and judicial decisions operating within those
frameworks have to be decided on an abuse of discretion basis,89
but even then, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment imposes a substantial limit on that discretion.9" The
Fourteenth Amendment makes the Eighth Amendment prohibition
against excessive fines applicable to this case, and the majority
here says that applies to the states. 91
So what you have at this point is the BMW case, holding
that excessive punitive damages may violate the Due Process
Clause itself.92 Then you have the Cooper case where the Court
states that the Due Process Clause implicates the Eighth
Amendment.93 Now you have a prohibition on excessive fines.94
Two years after the BMW decision in 1998, the Supreme Court
held in U.S. v. Bajakaian,95 that in viewing the disparity and the
proportionality between compensatory and punitive, you must do
a de novo review.96
There were some interesting comments in the Cooper
case. Justice Stevens made another distinction between
compensatory and punitive damages, stating that "actual damages
are a question of historical and predictive fact. "97 I guess in
more mundane days in our local courthouses we would say past
damages and future damages, but punitive damages are not a
finding of fact and therefore appellate review of punitive damages
does not implicate the Seventh Amendment. So if you can get
out from under the Seventh Amendment, you can get away from
Justice Ginsburg's dissenting argument that the Seventh
88 Id.89 d. at 432-33.
90 Id. at 433.
9' Id. at 433-34.
92 BMW, 517 U.S. at 582.
93 Cooper, 532 U.S. at 443.
94Id. at 434.
9' 524 U.S. 321 (1998).
96Id. at 337.
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Amendment right to a jury trial is being precluded by the de novo
review approach. 98 Justice Stevens was of the view that, as to the
first of the BMW guideposts, only with reprehensibility do the
lower court and the trial court have an advantage. 99 As to the
third guidepost, which is in comparison to other civil fines for the
same kind of conduct, he said that must be for an appellate
court. 1
00
So now we have from the Supreme Court the ruling that
as far as punitive damages are concerned, appellate review is de
novo and not deferential to what the jury has found. 10' Where
does that leave us in New York? Based on BMW, I think the
New York standards, or the lack of standards, are ripe for a good
look by a smart litigant. In the meantime, as tort reformers have
said, judges, not juries, will decide the punishment, and pattern
jury drafters will have some creating to do.
9'ld. at 446.
99Id. at 44 8.
' 0 Id. at 435-36.
'2' Cooper, 532 U.S. at 443.
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